COGNITIVE SCIENCE.
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Two Ways to Adopt a Norm: The (Moral?) Psychology of Internalization and Avowal
Fellow: Daniel Kelly |
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The Psychology of Normative Cognition
Fellow: Daniel Kelly Abstract: From an early age, humans exhibit a tendency to identify, adopt, and enforce the norms of their local communities. Norms are the social rules that mark out what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden in different situations for various community members. These rules are informal in the sense that although they are sometimes represented in formal laws, such as the rule governing which side of the road to drive on, they need not be explicitly codified to effectively influence behavior. There are rules that forbid theft or the breaking of promises, but also rules which govern how close it is appropriate to stand to someone while talking to them, or how loud one should talk during the conversation. Thus understood, norms regulate a wide range of activity. They exhibit cultural variability in their prescriptions and proscriptions, but the presence of norms in general appears to be culturally universal. Some norms exhibit characteristics that are often associated with morality, such as a rule that applies to everyone and prohibits causing unnecessary harm. Others norms apply only to certain people, such as those that delimit appropriate clothing for members of different genders, or those concerning the expectations and responsibilities ascribed to individuals who occupy positions of leadership. The norms that prevail in a community can be more or less fair, reasonable, or impartial, and can be subject to critique and change. This entry provides an overview of interdisciplinary research into the psychological capacity for norm-guided cognition, motivation, and behavior. The notions of a norm and normativity occur in an enormous range of research that spans the humanities and behavioral sciences. Researchers primarily concerned with the psychology distinctive of norm-governed behavior take what can be called “cognitive-evolutionary” approaches to their subject matter. These approaches, common in the cognitive sciences, draw on a variety of resources and evidence to investigate different psychological capacities. This entry describes how these have been used to construct accounts of those cognitive and motivational features of minds that underpin the capacity to acquire, conform to, and enforce norms. It also describes how theories of the selective pressures and adaptive challenges prominent in recent human evolution have helped to inform and constrain theorizing about this psychological capacity, as well as how its features can influence the transmission and cultural evolution of norms. By way of organization, the entry starts with basics and proceeds to add subsequent layers of intricacy and detail. Researchers taking cognitive-evolutionary approaches to norms come from a wide range of disciplines, and have formulated, explored, and debated positions on a large number of different issues. In order to present a comprehensible overview of these interconnected literatures, the entry starts by laying out main contours and central tenets, the key landmarks in the conceptual space common to different theories and claims. It goes on to provide a more detailed description of the kinds of theoretical resources that researchers have employed, and identifies important dimensions along which more specific accounts of the psychology of norms have varied. It then canvasses different sources of empirical evidence that have begun to illuminate other philosophically interesting features of the capacity for norms. Finally, it ends with a discussion of the relationship between norm cognition and morality, with a few illustrations drawn from recent debates in moral theory. |
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Minding the Gap: Bias, Soft Structures, and the Double Life of Social Norms
Fellow: Daniel Kelly Abstract: We argue that work on norms provides a way to move beyond debates between proponents of individualist and structuralist approaches to bias, oppression, and injustice. We briefly map out the geography of that debate before presenting Charlotte Witt’s view, showing how her position, and the normative ascriptivism at its heart, seamlessly connects individuals to the social reality they inhabit. We then describe recent empirical work on the psychology of norms and locate the notions of informal institutions and soft structures with respect to it. Finally, we argue that the empirical resources enrich Witt’s ascriptivism, and that the resulting picture shows theorists need not, indeed should not, choose between either the individualist or structuralist camp. |
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How Individual Habits Fit/Unfit Social Norms: From the Historical Perspective to a Neurobiological Repositioning of an Unresolved Problem
Fellows: Giuseppe Lorini, Francesco Marrosu Abstract: Human beings are “rule-following animals” or “nomic animals” whose behavior is strictly supported by social norms that reflect shared expectations on what a particular social context considers as appropriate behavior. Yet, little is known about the biological processes that determine how we learn to accept a particular social behavior as the most appropriate, and even less is available to highlight the deepest levels/reasons that motivate the trade-off between the daily practice of individual habits and the processes involved in conforming them to such codified social expectations as norms are. In this essay, the authors set out to investigate this particular human ability which is indeed fundamental to understanding our social world: in doing so we hypothesize that the biologically hardwired structural organization and the phenotype expressed by individual habits are the benchmark where social norms are challenged. However, by suggesting that the manifold modalities of observing or violating the norms can be subtly constrained by the individual neurobiological milieu, one can only add another problem as the essay cannot account for the very essence of this trade-off which remains largely unexplored and open to new exciting questions. Keywords: habits, social norms, nomic animal, neural network, normativity |
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The Sense of Commitment in Human–Robot Interaction
Fellow: John Michael Abstract: The sense of commitment is a fundamental building block of human social life. By generating and/or stabilizing expectations about contributions that individual agents will make to the goals of other agents or to shared goals, a sense of commitment can facilitate the planning and coordination of actions involving multiple agents. Moreover, it can also increase individual agents’ motivation to contribute to other agents’ goals or to shared goals, as well as their willingness to rely on other agents’ contributions. In this paper, we provide a starting point for designing robots that exhibit and/or elicit a sense of commitment. We identify several challenges that such a project would likely confront, and consider possibilities for meeting these challenges. Keywords: Commitment, Trust, Human–robot interaction, Joint action, Cooperation, Coordination |
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The Sense of Commitment: A Minimal Approach
Fellow: John Michael Abstract: This paper provides a starting point for psychological research on the sense of commitment within the context of joint action. We begin by formulating three desiderata: to illuminate the motivational factors that lead agents to feel and act committed, to pick out the cognitive processes and situational factors that lead agents to sense that implicit commitments are in place, and to illuminate the development of an understanding of commitment in ontogeny. In order to satisfy these three desiderata, we propose a minimal framework, the core of which is an analysis of the minimal structure of situations which can elicit a sense of commitment. We then propose a way of conceptualizing and operationalizing the sense of commitment, and discuss cognitive and motivational processes which may underpin the sense of commitment. Keywords: commitment, jointaction, cooperation, coordination, development |
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Prosocial effects of coordination – What, how and why?
Fellow: John Michael Abstract: A wealth of research in recent decades has investigated the effects of various forms of coordination upon prosocial attitudes and behavior. To structure and constrain this research, we provide a framework within which to distinguish and interrelate different hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms underpinning various prosocial effects of various forms of coordination. To this end, we introduce a set of definitions and distinctions that can be used to tease apart various forms of prosociality and coordination. We then identify a range of psychological mechanisms that may underpin the effects of coordination upon prosociality. We show that different hypotheses about the underlying psychological mechanisms motivate different predictions about the effects of various forms of coordination in different circumstances. Keywords: Coordination, Synchronization, Prosociality, Trust, Commitment, Cooperation |
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Creative Argumentation: When and Why People Commit the Metaphoric Fallacy
Fellow: Amitash Ojha Abstract: This article aims to understand when and why people accept fallacious arguments featuring metaphors (metaphoric fallacy) as sound arguments. Two experiments were designed to investigate, respectively, when and why participants fell into the metaphoric fallacy. In the first experiment, participants were provided with a series of syllogisms, presented in natural language, containing in their first premise either a lexically ambiguous, literal middle term or a metaphorical middle term, i.e. the term that “bridges” the first premise with the second premise, and ending with a true, false or plausible conclusion. For each argument they were asked to evaluate whether the conclusion followed from the premises. Results show that the metaphoric fallacy is harder to detect in case of arguments with plausible conclusion with a conventional metaphor rather than a novel metaphor as middle term. The second experiment investigated why participants considered the metaphoric fallacy with plausible conclusion as a strong argument. Results suggest that participants’ belief in the conclusion of the argument, independent from the premises, is a predictor for committing the metaphoric fallacy. We argue that a creative search for alternative reasons justifies participants’ falling into the metaphoric fallacy, especially when the framing effect of a metaphor covertly influences the overall reading of the argument. Thus, far from being a source of irrationality, metaphors might elicit a different style of reasoning in argumentation, forcing participants to find an alternative interpretation of the premises that guarantees the believed conclusion. In this process, conventional metaphors are revitalized and extended through the second premise to the conclusion, thereby entailing an overall metaphorical reading of the argument. Keywords: metaphor, analogy, creativity in argumentation, lexical ambiguity fallacy, belief in the conclusion |
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Interpreting Visual Metaphors: Asymmetry and Reversibility
Fellow: Amitash Ojha Abstract: In a verbal metaphor, the target and the source domains can usually be distinguished clearly, and some features of the source domain are mapped to the target domain, and not vice versa. This asymmetry of metaphor has been acknowledged in conceptual metaphor theory, as well as in interaction theory. However, the asymmetry of visual metaphor, in which concepts are depicted in images, is debated in the existing literature. The authors argue that the main reason behind this is that images lack an explicit copula (“X is Y”); so it is not always clear what a visual metaphor is about (what its target is). The authors explore the asymmetry of visual metaphors by considering a number of examples, and also by using the results of an empirical study they conducted with forty-four participants. Their study shows that, although the source and the target of visual metaphors are reversible more often than in their verbal counterparts, the transferred features usually change drastically by the reversal. This essay argues that the visual metaphors can appear to be symmetric more often than the verbal metaphors because the lack of copula can turn the focus on the comparison between the source and the target, instead of the target itself. The examples demonstrate that context plays a major role in this process by identifying the source and the target of a visual metaphor. Keywords: visual metaphor, asymmetry, context, interaction, juxtaposition |
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Are Hybrid Pictorial Metaphors Perceived More Strongly Than Pictorial Similes?
Fellow: Amitash Ojha Abstract: The present study examines the relationship between pictorial similes and hybrid pictorial metaphors. The results suggest that hybrid pictorial metaphors are perceived more strongly than pictorial similes when they are presented on their own and in corrective convention but not when they are verbalized. We argue that hybrid pictorial metaphors have transformational effects as the fusion of two concepts allow the reader to see one thing in terms of another. Juxtaposition in a pictorial simile merely suggests a search for similarity, which is not explicit. Results also showed that verbalized metaphor (X is Y) or the simile (X is like Y) forms are often used to convey a similar meaning and strength for pictorial simile and pictorial metaphor. However, in corrective scenarios participants are forced to reassess visual features: in this situation, pictorial metaphors are considered more strongly than pictorial similes even when they are verbalized. |
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An Empirical Study on the Role of Perceptual Similarity in Visual Metaphors and Creativity
Fellow: Amitash Ojha Abstract: We investigate the role of perceptual similarity in visual metaphor comprehension process. In visual metaphors, perceptual features of the source and the target are objectively present as images. Moreover, to determine perceptual similarity, we use an image-based search system that computes similarity based on low-level perceptual features. We hypothesize that perceptual similarity at the level of color, shape, texture, orientation, and the like, between the source and the target image facilitates metaphorical comprehension and aids creative interpretation. We present three experiments, two of which are eye-movement studies, to demonstrate that in the interpretation and generation of visual metaphors, perceptual similarity between the two images is recognized at a subconscious level, and facilitates the search for creative conceptual associations in terms of emergent features. We argue that the capacity to recognize perceptual similarity—considered to be a hallmark of creativity—plays a major role in the creative understanding of metaphors. |
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Young Children’s Understanding of Social Norms and Social Institutions
Fellow: Federico Rossano Abstract: Children are born into a world abundant with social norms that prescribe how one should and should not behave. Social norms also form the basis of more complex social institutions such as ownership that create obligations, rights and duties. As adults we typically navigate our social world effortlessly and mostly unaware of the intricate web of social norms and institutions shaping our behaviour. But when and how do young children first become aware of the norms and institutions of their socio-cultural group? In this chapter, we will first provide a definition of social norms and institutions and explain their most important characteristics. We will then present empirical evidence that children as young as 3 years of age already understand some crucial aspects of social norms. We will further use the example of ownership to argue that it is one of the first social institutions that young children understand. Keywords: Young Child, Social Norm, Social Institution, Moral Norm, Simple Game |
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Preschoolers’ Understanding of the Role of Communication and
Cooperation in Establishing Property Rights Fellow: Federico Rossano Abstract: Property as a social “agreement” comprises both a communicative component, in which someone makes a claim that she is entitled to some piece of property, and a cooperative component, in which others in the community respect that claim as legitimate. In the current study, preschool children were (a) given the opportunity to mark some objects as “theirs” (to claim them in the face of other fictitious children who would supposedly enter the room later); and (b) confronted with stickers in various spatial arrangements (e.g., piled up neatly vs. scattered), told that a fictitious child had previously chosen some for herself but had to suddenly leave the room, and then invited first to choose some stickers for themselves and second to identify which stickers had already been claimed by the fictitious child. Five-year-olds but not 3-year-olds were skillful in both of these tasks, demonstrating an understanding of the crucial role of communication in asserting property claims and the crucial role of cooperation in respecting them. Keywords: communication, cooperation, ownership, property, social cognition |
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Imitation or the Internalization of Norms: Is Twentieth-Century Social Theory Based on the Wrong Choice?
Fellow: Stephen Turner Abstract: The dispute between simulation theorists and theory theorists follows a basic pattern in philosophical discussions of cognitive science. This chapter brings some of the topics of social theory into the discussion. The discussion of the problem of understanding in social theory has developed in two traditions: Verstehen, or empathy, the German tradition of Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber, and in taking the role of the other originating in the thought of G. H. Mead. Each regards understanding as both an activity of theorists (or historians and other analysts) and of human beings themselves in the course of their dealings with one another. The topic of imitation became important in American psychology for reasons quite separate from its role in social theory. The psychological explanation holds that at least some emotions, and perhaps all real emotions, are universal and are explicable by features of human psychology, biology, and development that are themselves universal. |